permitted to retire for reconsideration. Counsel for defendant then stated that if the court was going to permit the jury to decide whether the parties should have divorces he would ask leave to amend his cross-complaint to secure one. Leave was granted. By the second verdict the jury found defendant not guilty of extreme cruelty, but found plaintiff guilty thereof. Defendant then refused to amend the cross-complaint in accordance with the permission granted, and moved the court that no decree of divorce be granted, but that plaintiff be required to pay alimony. Motion overruled. In Milliman *v.* Milliman, 101 Pacific Reporter, 58, the Colorado Supreme Court held that it would be contrary to public policy in such a case to permit the decree for divorce to stand. If the defendant did not desire a divorce, there is no power or authority of a court to grant one over her protest.

What Need a Prospective Citizen Know About Our Laws?—A native of Norway, having resided in this country for 24 years and in Minnesota for 18, while being examined as to his qualifications for citizenship, admitted that he did not know where the laws were made, but supposed the Governors made them; that he did not know the purpose of the Constitution, nor the names of the President or the Governor, nor the location of either the state or national capitol. He thought that Washington was President, and that Roosevelt was Governor, but confessed that he was not interested in these particulars. The objection was raised in State *v.* District Court, 120 Northwestern Reporter, 898, to his admission as a citizen, on the ground that he could not agree to support a Constitution of the existence and purport of which he had only a vague consciousness. It appeared that he was a sober, industrious, honest, law-abiding farmer, possessing the respect and confidence of his neighbors. The Supreme Court of Minnesota decided that, if the applicant was otherwise eligible, the fact that he had only a chaotic knowledge of the federal Constitution and form of government would not exclude him.

Negligence in Allowing Car to Be Crowded.—A passenger mounted the platform of a crowded street car, wherefrom he was pushed and injured because of overcrowding. In Lobner *v.* Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 101 Pacific Reporter, 463, defendant contended that plaintiff had voluntarily exposed himself to danger by riding on the platform of a crowded car, a danger which he had the best opportunity to discover and appreciate. The Kansas Supreme Court held, however, that the practice of inviting and permitting passengers to ride on the platforms of street cars is so common that it cannot be held, as a matter of law, that a passenger in doing so is guilty of contributory negligence. One who rides on a crowded car assumes the inconvenience resulting from its crowded condition, but the company is not, for that reason, relieved from the responsibility of using due care for the safety of passengers invited upon the car.